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INTERVENTION AFTER WEBSTER

Carl Tobias*
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services throws down the gauntlet on the "most politically divisive domestic legal issue of our
time," 1 imperiling women's progress in securing reproductive freedom and power in society. The battle over abortion rights is likely
to splinter an already deeply divided country. After fierce fighting
in many statehouses, some legislatures will pass statutes further
restricting abortion. The major battleground, however, will quickly
shift to the federal courts, where plaintiffs seeking to protect
procreative freedom will challenge these measures. Judges, parties,
and lawyers participating in this litigation will rigorously analyze
the issues of "substance" that Webster and the new state laws
implicate-questions involving the Constitution, privacy, women's
rights, precedent, statutory construction, medicine, science, religion, and morality.
·
In their haste to evaluate these critical issues, they must not
overlook the procedural questions and process values at stake.
Indeed, if certain procedural problems receive insufficient attention, they may preclude efforts to protect reproductive rights.
Issues involving intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24 pose significant difficulties and typify the procedural problems
that will pervade the anticipated abortion cases. 2 Two protracted
pieces of litigation that challenged restrictive abortion laws passed

• Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Jane Baron, Ron Collins,
Bill Luneburg, and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, to the Cowley Endowment and
the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support and to Luda Patlakh and Cassie Stankunas
for processing this piece. Errors that remain are mine.
l. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3079 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2. Rule 24 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted
to intervene in an action: ... (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common . . . . In exetcising its
discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
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after Roe v. Wade 3 illustrate the complications that may ensue.
TALES OF MODERN ABORTION LITIGATION

In Diamond v. Char/es, 4 the plaintiffs, physicians who provided
a complete range of family planning services, including abortion,
attacked the Illinois Abortion Act and, in October 1979, secured
a temporary restraining order precluding its enforcement. 5 Within
days, Dr. Eugene Diamond sought to intervene on the side of the
Illinois Attorney General and the Cook County State's Attorney,
allegedly to defend his pecuniary and professional interest in
prenatal patients and his interest as the "parent of an unemancipated minor daughter of child bearing age.' ' 6 Plaintiffs strenuously
opposed intervention, asserting that Dr. Diamond lacked any legally cognizable interest in the case and, alternatively, that amicus
curiae participation would suffice. 7 Nevertheless, the district judge
permitted intervention, allowing Dr. Diamond to file an answer,
a memorandum, and additional documents. 8
The trial court partially granted the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction the next month. The governmental defendants and the intervenor appealed. In 1980, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the lower court determination while directing that several
other statutory provisions be enjoined. 9 On remand in 1983, the
district judge enjoined twenty-five sections of the Act, including
its principal operative provisions . 10
The defendants and the intervenor appealed the trial court's
decision on three major sections, while the plaintiffs cross-appealed
a fourth provision's constitutionality. In 1984, the Seventh Circuit

3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
5. For the description of the case, I rely substantially on the detailed discussion of
the litigation in Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1059-61 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3214 (1989), supplementing that with citation to specific opinions when appropriate.
6. Id. at 1059. Dr. Diamond or his counsel, Americans United for Life Legal Defense
Fund, have participated in much litigation challenging Illinois abortion legislation. See,
e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985),
and cases cited therein; Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (N.D. Ill.), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff 'd, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.
1979); Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. lll.), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey,
582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978), later appeal, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
7. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1059.
8. Id. at 1059-60.
9. Id. at 1060; see also Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
10. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1060; see also Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. lll.
1983).
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ruled in favor of plaintiffs. 11 The Illinois Attorney General and
the State's Attorney decided against appeal. 12 In February 1985,
however, Dr. Diamond filed a notice of appeal and jurisdictional
statement with the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted
review, the case was fully briefed, and the argument was heard
the following November. In 1986, the Court dismissed Dr. Diamond's appeal because he lacked the requisite "standing" to pursue
the case absent the governmental defendants. 13
The plaintiffs filed two requests for expenses incurred in the
lower federal court litigation. The district judge awarded substantial fees against the intervenor in 1985; 14 the plaintiffs also successfully sought from the intervenor significant fees sustained in
the Supreme Court appeal during 1986.15 After complex, preliminary skirmishing over whether the intervenor had filed a timely
notice of appeal, 16 he was allowed to appeal the fee awards to the
Seventh Circuit, which, in 1988, essentially affirmed the trial court
determinations. 17
Thus, after nearly a decade of litigation, the plaintiffs were
vindicated; much of the time, money, and effort they expended
were attributable to someone who probably never should have
been permitted to intervene. The ultimate irony, and a fitting
epilogue to this Kafkaesque travail, is that plaintiffs who pursue
future, similar challenges may be unable to recover fees from
intervenors such as Dr. Diamond in light of the 1989 Supreme
Court opinion in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v.
Zipes. 18

II. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1060; see also Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984).
12. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1060; see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
13. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1060; see also Diamond, 476 U.S. at 64-71.
14. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1060-61.
15. Id.
16. See Charles v. Daley, 799 F.2d 343, 345-48 (7th Cir. 1986). This aspect of the
litigation offers interesting insights on the "real parties in interest" in modern abortion
litigation. The Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund sought to become a defendant
and to accept any intervenor fee liability because it had solicited intervenor participation.
See id. at 345.
17. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1077. The litigation concluded in 1989 when the Supreme
Court denied the intervenor's request that it review the fee award. Diamond v. Charles,
109 S. Ct. 3214 (1989). Cf. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852,
854 & n.I (6th Cir. 1988) (state intervenor alone appealed to circuit court), prob. juris.
noted sub nom. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 109 S. Ct. 3239, motion
denied, 110 S. Ct. 39 (J989).
18. See Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989). See
generally infra notes 165, 186, and accompanying text (explanation of problems Zipes
presents). Much litigation challenging Illinois legislation has been nearly as prolonged. See,
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This scenario is not an aberration. Consider the attack on the
constitutionality of a restrictive abortion ordinance adopted by the
city of Akron. In Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City
of Akron, 19 the district court denied the applicants' requests to be
appointed guardians ad litem for "unborn children" or "infants
born alive as the result of legal abortion." Over the plaintiffs'
opposition, the trial judge did grant the applicants' motions to
intervene, but severely curtailed their participation by limiting them
to amicus involvement on nearly all issues. 20 Notwithstanding these
restrictions, the applicants "litigated their claims vigorously," filed
approximately forty documents, "including at least 14 to which
plaintiffs had to independently respond .... [and] took an active
role at trial, occasionally requiring the Court to stop their inquiry
into areas beyond the permitted scope of intervention. " 21 The
intervenors fully participated in the circuit court proceedings as to
which they alone requested rehearing, unsuccessfully petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari, and filed briefs in other litigants'
consolidated appeals. 22 Although the plaintiffs secured significant
fees from intervenors, they might be unable to do so today. 23
These and similar procedural difficulties are likely to attend the
new abortion challenges. Some problems may even prevent resolution of the substantive disputes. Because intervention illustrates
the numerous procedural questions that are likely to arise, it
warrants a thorough examination.
The first section of this Article briefly examines Webster, principally to predict the abortion controversy's future course. The
analysis indicates that a number of state legislatures may impose
significantly more restrictive limitations on abortion. In most jurisdictions, the focus will swiftly shift to the federal courts as
plaintiffs seek to invalidate the new measures. The second section
of the Article examines the intervention questions that are likely
to arise in this litigation and explores the options available to

e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985);
Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed sub nom., Carey v. Wynn,
439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
19. 604 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ohio 1984). This case, and a number of others in this
Article, involved challenges to local ordinances. Although the litigation raises some issues
different from those raised by challenges to state statutes, they are sufficiently analogous
to warrant similar treatment here.
20. Id. at 1272.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1274-75. See also Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S.
Ct. 2732 (1989).
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address the participatory requests of abortion opponents. The
second section then evaluates how the federal judiciary actually
has treated the applications in circumstances identical or analogous
to those likely to be presented by the next round of abortion cases.
This evaluation reveals that the application of Rule 24 often has
enabled abortion opponents to delay the resolution of litigation,
to prejudice existing parties, and to impose significant costs on
the civil justice system. Recognizing the considerable potential for
similar problems to recur, the Article provides guidance for resolving requests to participate in abortion challenges and proposes
that the involvement of intervenors be sharply circumscribed. The
Article concludes by reflecting on the procedural problems and
process values that the new abortion litigation implicates. 24
I.

WEBSTER AND FUTURE ABORTION LITIGATION

The Supreme Court relied on the right of privacy and the
fourteenth amendment to invalidate abortion proscriptions in the
1973 landmark decision of Roe v. Wade. 25 That opinion and most
of its progeny have ignited a political controversy that steadily
intensified during the 1980s. 26 The Court's decisions in Roe and
later cases, which essentially defined a woman's constitutional right
to choose abortion, nonetheless fostered some public consensus
about reproductive rights. Although most states have severely
restricted abortion during the third trimester, they generally have
imposed no limitations in the first trimester and restrictions of
varying stringency during the middle trimester. 27 Of course, in a
nation as complex and varied as the United States, this approach
to abortion has not been universal; numerous states enacted more
restrictive legislation. Plaintiffs attacked· practically all of these

24. Of course, the new abortion litigation will implicate many procedural problems
and process values that the intervention questions do not, although the intervention issues
typify in certain respects many of them. It is critical to encourage work on the procedural
difficulties and process values implicated in abortion litigation that have been neglected to
date. For one recent valuable example of what I have in mind, see Pine, Speculation and
Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L.
REv. 655 (1988); see also Symposium on Reproductive Rights, 13 Nova L.J. 319 (1989).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. The author recognizes that what follows is controversial and truncated; it is meant,
however, to be a relatively balanced account tailored to the specific issues this piece treats.
27. For a recent representative compilation, see Comment, State Abortion Statutes
and Their Compliance with Roe v. Wade: The Battle Continues-Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 917 (1986-87).
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statutes, and the federal judiciary invalidated many of them. 28
Much of this litigation raised the intervention problems discussed
in this Article.
In short, the federal courts' treatment of burdensome abortion
regulation following Roe had continued to recognize women's
reproductive freedom. 29 These decisions encouraged additional attacks on restrictive measures and likely discouraged many states
from passing overly burdensome legislation. Although there apparently was considerable national consensus on abortion, it has
unraveled somewhat during the 1980s. The Supreme Court's recent
issuance of Webster promises to increase divisiveness while leading
to more restrictive abortion legislation and to concomitant federal
court challenges.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a four-Justice plurality in
Webster, upheld prohibitions on the use of public employees and
public facilities to perform nontherapeutic abortions 30 and also
upheld a requirement that doctors conduct viability tests before
performing abortions. 31 The plurality found "no occasion to revisit
the holding of Roe" 32 but disparaged its "rigid trimester analysis. "33 Although characterizing a woman's right to abortion as a

28. For examples of the Illinois legislation and litigation challenging it, see Charles v.
Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3214 (1989), discussed supra
notes 5-17 and accompanying text and infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text; and Keith
v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985), discussed infra notes
108-24 and accompanying text. Missouri's experience is similar. See Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3047 n.l (1989).
29. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416, 426-27 (1983).
30. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050-53. The plurality relied primarily on its abortion
funding precedents, particularly Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). For a thorough,
recent analysis of Webster, see Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REv. 105
(1989).
31. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3054-58. The plurality relied on Missouri's interest in
protecting potential human life. Correspondingly, it did not "pass on the constitutionality"
of the "findings" in the statute's preamble, providing that the "life of each human being
begins at conception" and that "[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health,
and well-being," primarily because the preamble expressed a value judgment and had not
been applied to regulate abortion or restrict appellees' activities. Id. at 3049-50.
32. Id. at 3058. The statute invalidated in Roe criminalized all abortions except to
save the woman's life, while Missouri premised its measure on fetal viability as the time
when its interest in potential life must be protected. Id.
33. Id. at 3056. The Chief Justice described that approach as the type of analysis the
Court reconsiders when it proves to be "unsound in principle and unworkable itf practice."
Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
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"liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, " 34 the
plurality stated that Webster's holding clearly will permit some
governmental regulation of abortion that earlier cases would have
proscribed. 35 The goal of constitutional adjudication is "not to
remove inexorably 'politically divisive' " questions from legislative
processes in which the ''people through their elected representatives" resolve important matters. 36 The Chief Justice chided the
dissent for suggesting that legislatures in a country in which women
are the majority would regard the opinion as "an invitation to
enact abortion regulation reminiscent of the dark ages. " 37 Such a
view does "scant justice" to legislators and the electorate. 38
Despite the plurality's protestations, invitation is the word that
most accurately captures Webster's implications. The opinion removes many restraints-practical, political, legal, and otherwiseon lawmakers, essentially inviting them to enact very restrictive
measures. 39 Numerous factors enhance the invitation's appeal: the
plurality's indication that it might reconsider Roe in the future, 40
Justice O'Connor's statement that "there will be time enough to
re-examine Roe" when a statute's invalidity actually turns on the
opinion's constitutional validity, 41 Justice Scalia's plea that Roe be
overruled explicitly, rather than effectively, 42 and the Court's decision on the day it issued Webster to grant review in the 1989
term to three new abortion cases. 43 Indeed, some legislators may
be inspired to advocate the most stringent legislation possible in
the hopes of provoking Roe's reconsideration. Even more cautious
lawmakers may be tempted to champion relatively restrictive measures, given the Court's preference for leaving abortion regulation

34. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058. The plurality acknowledged that certain of the Court's
precedents and the Webster dissent treated abortion as some type of fundamental privacy
right. Id. at 3057-58.
35. Id. at 3058 (citing City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416 (1983) and Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)).
36. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. It does so by abandoning Roe's trimester analysis and by converting the prior
right to abortion into a due process liberty interest that will rarely outweigh the newly
enhanced state interest in protecting "potential human life."
40. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056-58.
41. Id. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.).
42. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.).
43. The three cases are Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 109 S. Ct.
3239, motion denied, 110 S. Ct. 39 (1989); Turnock v. Ragsdale, 109 S. Ct. 3239, motion
denied, 110 S. Ct. 38, motion granted, 110 S. Ct. 532 (1989) (granting joint motion to
defer further proceedings); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 109 S. Ct. 3240, motion denied, 110 S.
Ct. 39, motion denied, 110 S. Ct. 317, motion granted, 110 S. Ct. 400 (1989).
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essentially with state legislatures and its willingness to tolerate
additional restrictions. Many limitations that formerly restrained
legislators have been eased and perhaps eliminated. Lawmakers
now have little reason-other than the force of public opinionto prevent them from passing measures that sharply curb reproductive freedom and test the outer limits of constitutionality.
Predicting all that Webster portends is impossible and fortunately
unnecessary for the purposes of this Article. Given Webster's
invitation, the severity and breadth of new abortion regulations
may be restrained only by their sponsors' creativity. Some statutes
may be similar to the parental consent provisions at issue in the
cases to be decided in the Court's 1989 term. 44 Other measures
will attempt to reinstitute regulation tantamount to that previously
invalidated, such as laws requiring a husband's permission for
abortion. 45 Additional legislation may be comparatively or wholly
new, like that prohibiting abortions to be performed because the
fetus is of an undesired gender. 46
If the restrictive new measures pass, plaintiffs will attempt to
invalidate them in federal court. These cases will raise many
procedural problems, several of which implicate intervention.

II.

INTERVENTION PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS

A.

Introduction

· Litigation challenging abortion statutes will present intervention
questions as the individuals or groups who lobbied for enactment
of those laws seek to intervene as of right or permissively under
Rule 24 or to participate as amici curiae. Allowing their involvement would have important implications. Intervenors essentially
have the rights of parties. They can raise issues for resolution that
litigants have not, participate in discovery, file motions and other
papers, introduce direct testimony and conduct cross-examination

44. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 3240, motion denied, I JO S. Ct. 38, motion granted, 110 S. Ct. 532 (1989).
45. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-72 (1976) and Planned
Parenthood v. Board of Medical Review, 598 F. Supp. 625, 633-42 (D.R.!. 1984) (Rhode
Island spousal notification provision unconstitutional). Cf. 18 PA. CooE §§ 3203-3220 (1989)
(requiring spousal notification).
46. See Ashcroft seeks limit on abortion, The Kansas City Times, Jan. 20, 1990, at
A-I, col. I (Missouri governor seeks state law prohibiting women from having more than
one abortion in the state and prohibiting abortions performed for sex selection). But cf.
Iowa Abortion-Rights Voters Altering Electoral Equation, N. Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at
Al, col. 5 (Iowa Republicans as a caucus will not push for major abortion restrictions in
the 1990 session).
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at trial, and appeal adverse substantive determinations. 47 Intervenors' involvement may deprive parties of control over their own
lawsuits, frustrate effective judicial case management, complicate
the issues to be treated, and delay the prompt resolution of
litigation. The original parties and the federal courts must devote
substantial time, money, and effort to intervenors' participation.
The expenditures can be very onerous, especially for plaintiffs with
limited resources, such as public interest litigants and those likely
to be challenging the new abortion laws. 48 The presence of intervenors also burdens an already overworked federal judiciary. 49
Some of the individuals and groups that have been denied intervenor status but who have been allowed to participate as amici
have required elaborate responses of parties and courts. 50 This
section of the Article considers the participatory options available
to the federal judiciary, examines how courts actually have responded to participatory requests filed in abortion cases, and
recommends an approach for treating future applications.
B.

A Framework for Analyzing Participatory Possibilities

Judges asked to permit intervention in the new abortion challenges have numerous options. Courts can grant or deny intervention of right, permissive intervention, or amicus status. They also
may impose appropriate conditions on any participation allowed.
This subsection examines how judges have treated requests lodged

47. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin,
863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988); New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
732 F.2d 452, 473 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984); 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER,
& M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CrvIL § 1920, at 488 (2d ed. 1986).
48. For an analysis of litigation costs and financing, public interest litigants, and
resource disparities between them and other parties, see Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights
Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89); Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public
Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C.L. REv. 745, 754-57, 765 & n.105 (1987).
49. See Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 287-91 (1989) (discussing "litigation explosion" and burdens civil
litigation imposes on federal judiciary); cf. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce
Judicial Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701
(1978) (evaluating intervention's costs to federal judiciary).
50. See, e.g., Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487, 497-502 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 623
F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1980); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 49899, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Ryan v. Klein, 412 U.S. 924, vacated sub nom.
Commissioner of Social Serv. v. Klein, 412 U.S. 925 (1973) (showing elaborate responses
to arguments by guardians ad !item for "unborn children"). Cf A Husband Fights for
Family Rights, NAT'L L.J., March 5, 1990, at 13 (intervenors cost plaintiff $50,000 in
"Baby Klein" case).
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principally in public law litigation that did not involve abortion. 51
1.

Rule 24(a)(2)

Rule 24(a)(2) provides that upon timely application, anyone with
an interest in the subject matter of the litigation shall be permitted
to intervene if the disposition of the litigation may impair the
applicant's interest, and the interest is not adequately represented
by existing parties. 52 A number of courts and commentators state
that applicants must satisfy all four requirements while recognizing
that they are interrelated. 53 Most of the numerous judges who deny
intervention enforce the conditions rather rigorously and literally,
demanding that applicants clearly prove each requirement. Correspondingly, many of the significant number of courts that grant
intervention apply the criteria more flexibly and pragmatically,
requiring considerably less of applicants. 54 Judges, whether they
read the rule narrowly or broadly, rely substantially on the provision's language, the purposes underlying the 1966 amendment,
and federal intervention-of-right jurisprudence, which has been
so mew hat unclear. 55
Many judges and writers have acknowledged the difficulty of
precisely defining "interest" as used in Rule 24(a)(2}. 56 Numerous
courts that restrictively interpret the first condition require that
potential intervenors have a direct, significant, legally protectable
interest in the litigation's subject matter, often citing the 1971

51. Public law litigation is a lawsuit that vindicates important social values affecting
many people. Thus, abortion cases are an important form of this litigation. See Tobias,
supra note 49, at 279-83 & nn. 54-82 (discussion of public law litigation).
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), reproduced supra note 2.
53. See, e.g., American Nat'I Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 146
(7th Cir. 1989); 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE , 24.07(1), at
24-50 - 24-51 (2d ed. 1987).
54. Those viewing the rule broadly argue that the amendment's drafters contemplated
more flexible, pragmatic application, while those viewing it narrowly claim that less change
was envisioned. See Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700-01 (D.C. Cir. 1967) and Kaplan,

Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (/), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 403-07 (1967). But see United States v. 36.96 Acres
of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986) and
Miller,. Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the "Class
Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 669-76 (1979). For a sense of the Supreme
Court's unclear jurisprudence, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.17 (3d
ed. 1985) and 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1908, at 264-70.
55. See supra note 54 and sources cited therein.
56. See, e.g., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178-80 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 7C C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1908, at 263-88.
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Supreme Court decision of Donaldson v. United States.57 Some
judges demand that applicants be able to state a claim for relief, 58
while an increasing number of courts requires interests equal to or
exceeding those required for standing. 59 Judges rarely find that
prospective intervenors have any interest in defending the constitutionality of statutes when governmental defendants are charged
by law with doing so. 60 Courts that read the interest criterion
expansively demand comparatively less of applicants, essentially
treating interest as a minimal threshold requirement. 61 For instance,
numerous judges state that the " 'interest' test is primarily a
practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many
apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and
due process. " 62
Few courts rely on the second criterion of impairment, partly
because it is so closely related to interest. 63 Thus, judges who
narrowly interpret Rule 24(a)(2) may not reach impairment once

57. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452,
463 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182,
185 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971).
58. See, e.g., Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366
(11th Cir. 1982) (intervenor must be at least real party in interest); Heyman v. Exchange
Nat'! Bank of Chicago, 615 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1980).
59. See United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986) (requiring interests exceeding standing); Southern Christian
Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (requiring interests
equal to standing).
60. For a sense of this judicial reluctance, see American Nat'I Bank & Trust v. City
of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 146-48 (7th Cir. 1989); Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236, 240-43
(5th Cir. 1984), rev'd on rehearing, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1022 (1986); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 143 (1st Cir. 1982). Cf. infra
notes 67-68 and accompanying text (invoking similar ideas in context of applying inadequate
representation requirement). But see Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
61. See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980); Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969). These courts often prefer to rely on the
impairment or inadequate representation requirements. See, e.g., County of Fresno, 622
F.2d at 436; United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 418-20 (D. Minn. 1972).
62. This is Judge Leventhal's articulation in Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C.
Cir. 1967). Accord Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1989)
and Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir.
1984).
63. See, e.g., American Nat'I Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 147
(7th Cir. 1989); 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1908, at 263.
The impairment criterion has received such treatment despite a 1966 amendment adopted
in response to a confusing Supreme Court opinion. See Proposed Amendments to Rules
of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) advisory
committee's note, 39 F.R.D. 69,109-10 (1966); 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE,
supra note 47, .§ 1908, at 301.
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they conclude that applicants lack sufficient interest. Correspondingly, courts that flexibly enforce the rule, having found the
requisite interest, are predisposed to considering it impaired or
prefer to rely on the inadequate representation condition. 64 The
few judges who depend substantially on impairment generally focus
on the stare decisis effect of a judgment rendered in the applicant's
absence. 65 Many courts that restrictively read the requirement find
this impact insufficient, often stating that applicants can pursue
separate, subsequent litigation. 66 Judges who interpret impairment
broadly consider adequate the stare decisis effect, apparently concluding that subsequent litigation would rarely succeed and, even
if it did, multiple litigation would be too costly for the judicial
system and for applicants. 67
If an applicant's interests may be impaired, intervention must
be granted unless the interests are "adequately represented by
existing parties." 68 Many judges who view Rule 24 narrowly, and
even a number who do not, find governmental representation
sufficient. Some courts demand that potential intervenors with
purposes similar to the government show collusion between that
litigant and the remaining parties, prove governmental nonfeasance, or show adversity of interest between the applicants and
the government. 69 A number of judges employ a presumption of
adequacy when one litigant is charged by law with representing
applicants, a presumption that can be overcome only with a very
compelling showing to the contrary. 70 Numerous courts that read
64. See sources cited supra note 61.
65. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). Cf. American Nat'/ Bank & Trust, 865 F.2d at 148; Bethune
Plaza, 863 F.2d at 533 (stare decisis effect not sufficient when amicus curiae participation
would suffice).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826-27 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted in part, Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 476 U.S. 1157, cert.
dismissed, 478 U.S. 1030, motion granted, 478 U.S. 1047 (1986), vacated, 480 U.S. 370
(1987); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 910-11 (D.C. Cir.
1977), later proceeding, Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
68. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2). The treatment in this paragraph is tailored to the contexts
the anticipated abortion litigation is likely to present.
69. See, e.g., Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1133, 1135 (3d Cir. 1982); Liddell v.
Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1976).
70. See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1986);
Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98 F.R.D. II, 16-17 (E.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 710 F.2d
1040 (5th Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987). The presumption is
peculiarly applicable in litigation challenging statutes' constitutionality. See, e.g., American
Nat'! Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1989); United Nuclear
Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1982).
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the Rule expansively use more lenient tests of inadequacy and
require less of applicants, scrutinizing closely their interests and
the litigants' interests. For example, when judges discern any
possibility of conflict between them, representation is found insufficient.71 Some courts invoke the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers: 72 An applicant must
only prove that "representation of his interest 'may be' inadequate;
and the burden of making that showing should be treated as
minimal. " 73
Rule 24(a)(2) also requires "timely application," a command on
which the accompanying advisory committee note is silent. 74 The
Supreme Court has directed that the timeliness inquiry focus on
"all the circumstances. " 75 The lower courts have developed numerous criteria to determine timeliness. Most important are how
long applicants knew or reasonably should have known of their
interests before petitioning, the injury to them should intervention
be denied, and prejudice to existing parties attributable to delayed
application. 76 Judges who treat the condition narrowly emphasize
harm to litigants, often scrutinizing the reasons proffered for delay,
any significant passage of time, and applicant prejudice. 77 Courts
that are more flexible about timeliness stress harm to applicants
and view sympathetically their excuses for delay while evincing less
concern about party prejudice and the passage of time. 78
Courts resolving intervention requests also invoke numerous
policies derived from sources other than the language of the Rule's
four requirements. 79 Some judges candidly acknowledge that Rule
24(a)(2) has a discretionary dimension. These judges clearly exercise

71. See, e.g., Stringfellow, 783 F.2d at 827-28; Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep't
of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1984).
72. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
73. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n.10. See, e.g., Stringfellow, 783 F.2d at 827; Sagebrush
Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983), later appeal sub nom. Sagebrush
Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1986).
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee's note.
75. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973).
76. See, e.g., Gould v. Alleco, Inc., 883 F.2d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 1989); County of
Orange v. Air California, 799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946
(1987); Garrity v. Gallen, 697 F.2d 452, 455 (!st Cir. 1983).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 865 F.2d 2, 5-6 (1st Cir.
1989); Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98 F.R.D. 11, 24-25 (E.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 710
F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987). Cf. Garrity,
697 F.2d at 458 (undue expenditures of judicial resources relevant factor).
78. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1989); Chiles v.
Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (!Ith Cir. 1989).
79. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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that discretion even though the provision's phrasing is mandatory
in contrast to that of Rule 24(b), which is explicitly addressed to
judicial discretion. 80 While courts could be criticized for applying
policies drawn from sources external to the Rule and for injecting
discretionary elements into what is ostensibly a compulsory determination, the express and implicit judicial reliance on these policies
warrants their examination.
Judges who interpret the Rule restrictively rely substantially on
the policies that come under the rubric of prejudice to existing
parties. Such concerns include the litigants' rights to control their
own lawsuits and the resources they would have to devote to the
participation of intervenors. 81 Related policies implicate effective
judicial case management and considerations of judicial economy
for overburdened courts. Judges who broadly read Rule 24 rely
most on prejudice to applicants. They also find important the
applicants' potential contributions to issue resolution-in terms of
expertise, the submission of new information, the introduction of
questions litigants did not raise, and the adoption of different
perspectives on issues in dispute-and corresponding improvements
in judicial decisionmaking that the input might foster. 82 Moreover,
courts may want to afford applicants an opportunity to be heard,
or they may be concerned about governmental accountability or
public acceptance of governmental decisionmaking. 83
2.

Rule 24(b)(2)

Applicants typically seek in the alternative permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2). This subsection provides that upon timely
application, a court may allow intervention "when an applicant's

80. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 991 &
n.20 (2d Cir. 1984); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 7C C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1913, at 375-76.
81. The most comprehensive judicial exposition of these policies is in the Hooker
Chemicals opinion. Cf. Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988)
(providing additional valuable analysis). For additional treatment, see supra notes 48-49
and accompanying text; 3B J. KENNEDY & J. MOORE, supra note 53, at 24-51 - 24-52.
82. See, e.g., United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 860-62 (7th Cir.
1985) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986); and Sagebrush Rebellion,
Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983), later appeal sub nom. Sagebrush Rebellion,
Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1986).
83. See, e.g., American Nat'! Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 148-49
(7th Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J., concurring); New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line
Co., 732 F.2d 452, 473-75 (5th Cir.) (Williams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019
(1984). The public acceptance and accountability ideas have considerable applicability to
legislative branch decisionmaking, although they have greater application to administrative
agency decisionmaking. See Tobias, supra note 49, at notes 342-44 and accompanying text.
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claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or
fact in common," a requirement that has not changed since 1938. 84
Rule 24(b) leaves the determination to the district judge's discretion
but prescribes one factor to guide its exercise: whether "intervention will unduly delay or prejudice" adjudication of the parties'
rights. 85
Several considerations complicate the analysis of Rule 24(b)
judicial decisionmaking. One is its highly discretionary nature.
Another is that precedent is unhelpful, because courts respond to
the peculiar factors before them in each case. 86 Moreover, most
judicial treatment is very terse. Courts often do not mention the
Rule's requirements or offer any justification, even allowing resolution to go unreported. Nevertheless, it is possible to provide an
account of permissive intervention decisionmaking premised on
available sources.
Many courts that deny intervention of right also reject permissive
intervention, especially when applicants lack a Rule 24(a)(2) interest. 87 Correspondingly, some courts state that the common question
of law or fact criterion requires an interest that would substantiate
a legal claim or defense. 88 Judges employ such approaches even
though the absence of the term "interest" from Rule 24(b)(2)
suggests that an "interest" requirement may be inadvisable. 89 Even

84. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2). Cf. 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra
note 47, § 1911, at 355-56 (provision unchanged but affected by significant 1966 amendment
of Rule 24(a)(2)). The timeliness requirement is treated similarly to that for Rule 24(a)(2).
See, e.g., In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (D.
Mass.), later proceeding, 716 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1989); Garrity v. Gallen, 697 F.2d
452, 455 (!st Cir. 1983).
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2); United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188,
191-92 (2d Cir. 1978); 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1913, at
375-79 (broad district court discretion guided by factor characterized as "principal consideration").
86. See 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1911, at 393.
87. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 18789 (5th Cir. 1989); New Orleans Pub. Serv., 732 F.2d at 463-73.
88. See, e.g., Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1982); True GunAll Equip. Corp. v. Bishop Int'! Eng'g. Co., 26 F.R.D. 150, 151 (E.D. Ky. 1960). Cf.
Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977) (nature and
extent of applicant's interest relevant factors).
89. See 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1911, at 356-58. The
Supreme Court may have created some confusion by stating that Rule 24(b) "plainly
dispenses" with any requirement of a direct pecuniary or personal interest but that it
demands an interest that would support a legal defense or claim based on the interest. See
SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 459-60 (1940). Accord
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 76 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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wheri there is a common question of law or fact, courts can and
do rely on their substantial discretion to deny permissive intervention.
Judges, in exercising this discretion, frequently take into account
numerous considerations, some of which are explicitly included in
Rule 24(a)(2) or comprise its underlying policies. 90 Courts denying
permissive intervention treat as paramount the Rule's expressly
stated concern about party prejudice, or they find that prejudice
and other factors, including judicial economy, warrant denial. 91
Courts granting permissive intervention are persuaded by other
factors, including the applicants' need to participate or their potential contributions to the case's thorough factual development
or to the fair adjudication of pertinent legal issues. 92 These courts
may find applicant prejudice dispositive or that it and other factors
are overriding. Even when the applicants' participation might delay
or prejudice the parties' rights, neither the delay nor prejudice is
considered "undue. " 93
3.

Amicus Curiae
When courts deny intervention of right or perm1ss1ve intervention, they may allow amicus curiae involvement. They often seem
more willing to grant amicus than party status. 94 Judges rarely
provide any explanation for permitting or rejecting amicus participation and occasionally invite such involvement sua sponte. An
amicus does not become a party to the litigation, is unable to
present claims or defenses in the suit, and lacks appellate rights. 95

90. Compare Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirements, discussed supra notes 52-83 and accompanying text, with the requirements listed in United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d
188, 191-92 (2d Cir. 1978); Spangler, 552 F.2d at 1329; In re Acushnet River & New
Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (D. Mass.), later proceeding, 716 F. Supp. 676
(D. Mass. 1989).
91. See, e.g., Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 359 (5th Cir. 1984) (amicus participation
more expeditious when applicant presents no new legal questions); Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98
F.R.D. II, 26 (E.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 710 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1983), later
proceeding, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987).
92. For a thorough recent example, see Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1023-26.
93. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 340 F.
Supp. 400, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972)
(applicant's expertise helpful and participation would not delay or prejudice defendants).
94. This is true of certain judges whose opinions were analyzed above. See, e.g., Lelsz,
98 F.R.D. at 26; Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 483, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Cf. 7C C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1913, at 392 (if intervention is denied, the common
practice is to allow amicus participation, but even that is sometimes denied). See generally
Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief· From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963).
95. See Krislov, supra note 94, at 703, 717-18; 13 J. MOORE, H. BENDIX & B. RINGLE,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE , 836.03 (2d ed. 1986).
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The gratit -iS completely discretionary; courts may ignore, and
frequently do not respond in opinions to, amici submissfons. These
considerations mean that amicus participation minimizes intervention's disadvantages, such as the risks of prolonging litigation,
while affording many of its benefits. For instance, judges can
glean most of applicants' potential contributions to issue resolution, especially on legal questions, and provide them some opportunity to be heard.%
4.

Conditioning Participation

Those applicants allowed to participate as intervenors or even
as amici can complicate the issues to be resolved, delay the prompt
disposition of litigation, and impose significant costs on the original
parties and the judicial system. The advisory committee note to
Rule 24(a)(2) states, however, that a grant of "intervention of
right under the amended rule may be subject to appropriate
conditions or restrictions responsive among other things to the
requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings. " 97 Many
judges have recognized the validity and value of structuring participation, and numerous courts have imposed conditions on intervenor and amicus involvement. 98 For example, they have required
closely aligned individuals or groups to participate through a single
representative. 99 Judges also have restricted the participants in
terms of their status, the claims and issues they could raise, the
procedures they could invoke, and the stages of proceedings in
which they could participate. 100

96. The potential benefits and reduced risks of amicus participation probably explain
courts' greater willingness to grant it.
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) advisory committee's note.
98. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 377-78 (1987)
(Brennan, J ., concurring) (validity of structuring both types of intervention); United States
v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 991-93 (2d Cir. 1984) (validity of
structuring intervention of right and citations to cases doing so); 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1922, at 502-05 (validity of structuring both types of
intervention).
99. A valuable example is United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 420
(D. Minn. 1972), later proceeding, 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn.), remanded, 498 F.2d 1073
(8th Cir. 1974). Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
578 F.2d 1341, 1345-46 (10th Cir. 1978).
100. For examples of the type of restrictive conditions that can be imposed, see
Stringfellow, 480 U.S. at 373, and Hooker Chems., 749 F.2d at 991-93. Cf. In re Acushnet
River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1022-23 (D. Mass.), later proceeding,
716 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1989) (self-imposed conditions to insure permissive intervention
granted).
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In short, when plaintiffs challenge restrictive abortion regulation,
abortion opponents have several means of seeking to participate
in the litigation, and the federal judiciary will have numerous ways
of responding. The responses of courts to applications submitted
in cases identical or analogous to the anticipated abortion cases
are analyzed below.
C. Judicial Treatment of Requests To Participate in Abortion
Litigation
.,
The courts' responses to participatory requests can be difficult
to ascertain. Discerning what some courts have done is impossible,
because their decisions have not been reported. For example, courts
have resolved applications on motion, in memorandum opinions,
or from the bench. When courts' determinations appear in the
federal reporter system or are otherwise available, judicial treatment can be quite terse, providing minimal explanation or failing
to mention disposition. 101
Nevertheless, it is possible to offer an account of courts' resolution of participatory requests by consulting the numerous decisions that have been reported or are otherwise available. 102 These
sources indicate that a majority of courts has refused to permit
intervention of right, although a significant number of judges has
granted such intervention or allowed permissive intervention. More
courts have permitted amicus curiae participation. 103
1.

Judicial Treatment Denying Participation

Numerous courts rejecting requests to participate have offered
comparatively thorough explanations for their determinations, perhaps attempting to justify the denials. 104 Judges rejecting petitions

101. For example, "[t]he District Court did not indicate whether the intervention was
permissive or as of right and it did not describe how Diamond's interests" satisfied the
requirements of Rule 24. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 58 (1986). Cf. Keith v. Daley,
764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985) (district judge denied
intervention motion without written opinion).
102. This account is premised on determinations that appeared in the federal reporter
system or were available on LEXIS since 1975 and, thus, could be skewed by inaccessible
decisionmaking. Cf. Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, supra note 48, at 489-91
(similar methodology and cautions in context of analyzing decisionmaking involving Rule
11 sanctions).
103. These obviously are approximations and subject to the caution mentioned supra
note 102.
104. These courts appear more willing than judges granting requests to reduce to written
form and to report their determinations, which also are more expansive. See infra notes
146-59 and accompanying text.

1990]

INTERVENTION AFTER WEBSTER

749

to intervene of right generally have found that applicants lacked
sufficient interest in the subject matter of the litigation and that,
even if they possessed the requisite interest, the governmental
defendants were adequate representatives. 105 In exercising their
substantial discretion to deny permissive intervention, courts generally have determined that the applicants' defenses lacked any
question of law or fact in common with the main action, and that
if there were such a question, the prejudice to existing parties, or
prejudice and other factors, outweighed the need for intervention.106
The Seventh Circuit case of Keith v. Daley 101 is similar to the
anticipated abortion litigation. It affords the most comprehensive
federal court examination of the relevant issues and exemplifies
much pertinent judicial treatment. The majority and concurring
Supreme Court opinions in the closely related case of Diamond v.
Charles, 108 discussed earlier, also offer insight into likely judicial
treatment of procedural issues in future abortion litigation.

105. There is an important conceptual link between the two requirements in the context
of abortion. Compare supra note 60 and accompanying text with supra notes 70-73 and
accompanying text.
106. Courts seem to recite a standard litany. See, e.g., infra notes 123-25, 143-44 and
accompanying text. I found no opinions explicitly denying amicus participation, while many
courts rejecting intervention granted amicus status or suggested it was appropriate. See,
e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 78 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 980 (1985); Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 483, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The overwhelming majority of courts has rejected applicants' requests to be appointed guardian ad
!item for "unborn children." See, e.g., Roe, 464 F. Supp. at 486-87 (unborn children not
persons with a legally protectable interest within meaning of Rule 24(a)(2) and the appointment of guardians ad /item neither warranted nor required). More terse rejections are
reported in Diamond, 476 U.S. at 58; Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron,
604 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 & n.4 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1000
(N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d
193 (7th Cir. 1979). Cf. Turnock v. Ragsdale, 110 S. Ct. 38 (denial of motion for leave
to represent children unborn and born alive), motion granted, 110 S. Ct. 532 (1989); McRae
v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (responding to guardian petition by
granting intervention to make contentions for "unborn class" but rejecting substantive
arguments), appeal dismissed sub nom. Buckley v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916, vacated sub nom.
Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977). But see Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center,
347 F. Supp. 496, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Ryan v. Klein, 412 U.S. 924,
vacated sub nom. Commissioner of Social Serv. v. Klein, 412 U.S. 925 (1973) (permitting
participation by guardian ad litem for "unborn children").
107. 764 F.2d at 1265.
108. 476 U.S. at 54. The interests applicants asserted in Keith and Diamond encompass
nearly all of the plausible interests that are likely to be alleged in the anticipated abortion
litigation. See generally infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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In Keith, doctors who performed abortions challenged the constitutionality of restrictive Illinois legislation. 109 The Illinois ProLife Coalition (IPC), a nonprofit organization that advocated the
measure throughout its consideration in the statehouse, sought to
intervene of right and permissively on the side of the governmental
defendants. The district judge denied both requests and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed those determinations. 110
The appellate court, in addressing Rule 24(a)(2), stated that a
prospective intervenor must have a "direct, significant and legally
protectable interest in the property at issue,'' an interest premised
on the applicant's own right, not that of existing parties, and one
so direct that it would support a claim for relief. 111 The circuit
panel then reviewed all of the interests IPC asserted to determine
if any met its "direct and substantial interest" test. 112
The court found insufficient IPC's interests as the chief lobbyist
for the disputed legislation, its role in promoting restrictive abortion measures, and its need to insure the enactments' proper
defense when attacked. 113 The appellate judges characterized IPC's
purpose as "essentially communicative and persuasive" and encouraged the "lobbyist" to exercise its first amendment rights to
persuade others, observing that "such a priceless right to free
expression, however, does not also suggest that IPC has a right
to intervene in every lawsuit involving abortion rights, or to forever
defend statutes it helped to enact." 114 The court added that the
governmental officials charged with defending or enforcing the
legislation could be the only defendants in the litigation, implying
that they alone had sufficient interests. 115 Moreover, the panel
rejected as "far too speculative" for intervention the Coalition's
assertion of its members' interest in adopting fetuses surviving
abortion. 116 The court summarily dismissed IPC's contention that
the interest requirement must be broadly interpreted in public law

109. 764 F.2d at 1267.
110. Id. The trial court granted IPC amicus status, "stating that it would carefully
consider 'any briefs"' IPC filed. Id. at 1268.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1268-72.
113. Id. at 1269.
114. Id. at 1270. Cf. Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care Center v. Arft, 82 F.R.D.
181, 182 (E.D. Wis. 1979), appeal dismissed, 622 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1980) (voters may not
claim significantly protectable interest in every ordinance they support so as to entitle them
to intervene of right in cases challenging its constitutionality). Accord Fox Hill Surgery
Clinic v. Overland Park, No. 77-4120, Slip op. at 3 (D. Kan. Nov. 9, 1977).
115. Keith, 764 F.2d at 1269.
116. Id. at 1271. The panel also found insufficient !PC's interest in protecting '"unborn'
children," observing that the "state alone ... can assert an interest in the unborn." Id.
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litigation when public interest groups seek to intervene, proclaiming
that "Rule 24(a) precludes a conception of lawsuits, even 'public
law' suits, as necessary forums for such public policy debates" as
those involving abortion. 117
The panel, in holding that IPC lacked the requisite interest,
purported to discuss only that requirement, but it also referred to
the three other criteria included in Rule 24(a). 118 The appeals court
stated that the IPC had failed to satisfy the Rule's third command
because the defendants were adequately representing the organization.119 The court rejected !PC's suggestions that the governmental defendants lacked its "conviction and thorough knowledge
of the subject area" and that a subjective comparison of applicants'
and defendants' commitment to the litigation was the proper test. 120
The panel stated that "adequacy can be presumed when the party
on whose behalf the applicant seeks intervention is a governmental
body or officer charged by law with representing" the movants'
interests, 121 emphasizing that it need not rely solely on the presumption, as the record indicated sufficient representation, and
IPC had made no contrary allegations. 122
The circuit court's affirmance of the district judge's denial of
permissive intervention was comparatively terse. It observed that
the decision is entrusted to the trial court's discretion and that the
determination would be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. 123
The circuit panel stated that the district judge rejected permissive
intervention because IPC lacked a "direct claim or right" in the

117. Id. at 1268, 1270. Accord Arft, 82 F.R.D. at 182. Cf. Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp.
483, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (similar general treatment of interest in context of abortion
funding challenge); Overland Park, Slip op. at 5 (same treatment .of abortion ordinance
challenge).
118. The panel found timeliness satisfied and only alluded to impairment in analyzing
interest and inadequate representation, adding that applicants have the burden of proving
all four requirements. See Keith, 764 F.2d at 1268. Cf. Overland Park, Slip op. at 7-9
(helpful treatment of timeliness and impairment in context of abortion ordinance challenge);
Bossier City Medical Suite, Inc. v. Bossier City, 483 F. Supp. 633, 642-43 (W.D. La. 1980)
(similar treatment of timeliness, weighing prejudice to existing parties against prejudice to
applicant).
119. 764 F.2d at 1270.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Cf. Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979) ("no doubt
as to the adequacy of the representation" defendant state and county officials would
provide); Overland Park, Slip op. at 10-12 (governmental expertise relevant factor in
deciding adequacy of representation in abortion ordinance challenge).
123. Keith, 764 F.2d at 1272.
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litigation and to prevent undue delay or prejudice to the parties. 124
The Court found that discretion had not been abused. 125
The Supreme Court opinions in Diamond126 are also pertinent
to the intervention issues the abortion litigation will raise, 127 even
though Diamond differs from Keith in certain respects. The concurring justices determined that Dr. Diamond, who asserted somewhat different interests from IPC but was permitted to intervene
below, had not been a proper intervenor. 128 The majority did not
resolve that issue or more specifically, whether such an applicant
must possess standing, although it did make observations relevant
to those issues in determining whether Dr. Diamond's interests
could support a Supreme Court appeal in the defendants' absence.129 Dr. Diamond's interests were identical to or resembled
those that have been and will be asserted in many abortion cases.
In Diamond, physicians who performed abortions attacked the
constitutionality of the 1979 Illinois Abortion Law. 130 Dr. Diamond
premised his intervention motion on conscientious objection to
abortions as well as his status as a pediatrician and as the father
of an unemancipated minor girl. 131 The district judge, in granting
the petition, neither described the type of intervention allowed nor
explained how the physician's interests satisfied Rule 24. 132 The
intervenor alone appealed to the Supreme Court, 133 after trial and
appellate courts had permanently enjoined several provisions of
the abortion statute. 134 The majority dismissed the appeal for want
of jurisdiction in the state's absence, because Dr. Diamond lacked
any judicially cognizable interest in the legislation. 135
Although the Court relied on the intervenor's lack of standing
and explicitly refrained from deciding whether an applicant seeking
to intervene in a district court must have standing, the majority's
observations, especially regarding Diamond's claimed interests, are

124. Id.
125. Id. Cf. Overland Park, Slip op. at 13 (terse denial of permissive intervention for
"same reasons" as intervention of right).
126. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
127. See id. See generally supra note 108.
128. 476 U.S. at 71-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
129. Id. at 61-71.
130. Id. at 57.
131. Id. at 57-58.
132. Id. at 58; see also supra note 101.
133. 476 U.S. at 56.
134. Id. at 58-61.
135. Id. at 71.
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instructive. 136 The Court found insufficient Dr. Diamond's asserted
interest in the legislation's enforcement because private citizens
· lack any judicially cognizable interest in the state's prosecution of
others. 137 It also characterized as speculative his claim that as a
physician he would have more fee-paying patients if the statute
were enforced.'3 8 Moreover, the majority rejected standing premised on parenthood principally because Dr. Diamond had not
shown that his daughter was a minor or could not pursue her own
rights. 139
Justice O'Connor, writing a concurrence in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined, stated that Dr. Diamond had
been improperly permitted to intervene below .140 She found that
his alleged interests fell "well outside the ambit of Rule 24(a)(2)"
as elaborated in pertinent case law, which requires a "direct and
concrete interest that is accorded some degree of legal protection. " 141 The concurrence characterized the "abstract interests advanced [as] less 'significantly protectable' than the interest"
considered deficient in Donaldson v. United States and emphasized
that "only the State has a 'significantly protectable interest"' in
defending the standards of its criminal code. 142
Justice O'Connor also determined that Dr. Diamond had failed
to meet the requirement of Rule 24(b) that his asserted defense
have a question of law or fact in common with the principal
action. 143 She observed that the operative language requires an
"interest sufficient to support a legal claim or defense" founded
on the interest and that Dr. Diamond proffered ''no actual, present

136. The majority stated: "We need not decide today whether a party seeking to
intervene before a district court must satisfy ... the requirements of Art. III." Id. at 6869. The majority's observations may be compelling for courts that apply the interest
requirement strictly, but they also may help to define interest for judges who enforce the
criterion more leniently. See infra text accompanying notes 173-77.
137. 476 U.S. at 64-65.
138. Id. at 66. The Court also rejected Dr. Diamond's claim that as a physician he
had standing to litigate the medical standards that ought to be applied in the performance
of abortions: "Diamond has an interest, but no direct stake, in the abortion process ....
Similarly, Diamond's claim of conscientious objection to abortion does not provide a
judicially cognizable interest." Id. at 67.
139. Id. The Court also rejected Dr. Diamond's claim of standing to assert the rights
of unborn fetuses as his prospective patients: "Nor can Diamond assert any constitutional
rights of the unborn fetus. Only the State may invoke regulatory measures to protect that
interest, and only the State may invoke the power of the courts when those regulatory
measures are subject to challenge." Id.
140. Id. at 71 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
141. Id. at 74-75.
142. Id. at 75-76.
143. Id. at 76-77.
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interest" enabling him to litigate or be sued in a lawsuit sharing
common questions with the case he sought to enter . 144
2.

Judicial Treatment Granting Participation

Analyzing the reasoning of courts that have permitted participation is considerably more difficult. Many decisions apparently
go unreported, and the available opinions can be cryptic. For
example, some courts granting intervention have not stated whether
it is of right or permissive. 145 Others have provided only minimal
explanation for the decisions, failing even to mention Rule 24's
requirements, much less how they were satisfied. 146 Nonetheless, it
is possible to glean a sense of judicial treatment by examining the
available sources. 147
Most courts allowing intervention of right have applied Rule 24
flexibly and pragmatically. For example, one circuit judge urged
that the interest requirement be expansively interpreted in public
law litigation and considered adequate the applicants' "interest in
adopting live-born fetuses" because it implicated "fundamental
issues ... of life and death.'' 148 The judge refused to demand that
they possess standing or have interests sufficient to be parties. 149

144. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that the requirement had remained identical since 1938
and that the "words 'claim or defense' manifestly refer to the kinds of claims or defenses
that can be raised in courts of law as part of an actual or impending law suit .... " Id.
Cf. Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care Center v. Arft, 82 F.R.D. 181, 183 (E.D. Wis.
1979), appeal dismissed, 622 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1980) ("lack of clear legal dispute between
applicants and plaintiffs" precludes finding that "claim or defense is truly in common with
legal or factual issues raised" by principal claim and defense).
145. See supra note IOI and accompanying text.
146. Diamond is the best example. See supra note 101. There are, however, numerous
others. See, e.g., Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 544
(D. Me. 1979); Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd sub nom. Wynn
v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978), later appeal, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
147. I rely on the same sources as are mentioned supra note 102, although the treatment
is more general rather than focusing on two major cases. The slightly altered factual
contexts may explain the results in some cases below. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.
Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 869 (8th Cir. 1977) (applicants' property
interest asserted in context of abortion ordinance challenge is the "most elementary type
of right" Rule 24 protects); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Kempiners, 531 F. Supp. 320,
323 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (similar treatment of interests of entity providing pregnancy counseling
and referral services supported by challenged statute), vacated, 700 F .2d 1115 (7th Cir.
1983). But see Fox Hill Surgery Clinic v. Overland Park, No. 77-4120, slip op. (D. Kan.
Nov. 9, 1977).
148. Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
149. Id. at 1272-73 (Cudahy, J ., concurring). Cf. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193, 196
(7th Cir. 1979) (no persuasive authority suggests intervening defendant's appeal may be
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Courts have accorded little consideration to the impairment requirement. They seem to find it easily satisfied, apparently recognizing that a judgment on the constitutional issues would clearly
impair applicants' interests. 1so
Most judges permitting intervention have been willing to employ
tests of inadequate representation and corresponding burdens of
proof that are relatively solicitous of applicants. When scrutinizing
applicants' interests and those of the government, the courts have
found sufficient any apparent conflicts or deficiencies. Judges have
invoked the Supreme Court's comparatively liberal articulation of
insufficiency and what must be shown while ignoring the presumption that governmental defendants are adequate representatives.1s1 These courts virtually never mention timeliness, apparently
because abortion opponents' strong interest in restrictive legislation
led them to seek intervention soon after the litigation's commencement. Insofar as timeliness entered the judges' decisionmaking,
they probably considered that prejudice to applicants and their
potential contributions to issue resolution outweighed harm to
parties or the judicial system.
Courts allowing intervention also have relied expressly or implicitly on policy concepts that underlie or implicate Rule 24 or
are exogenous to it. For instance, one judge found significant the
magnitude of an applicant's expertise in, and commitment to, the
abortion question while arguing that its involvement would not
encumber, but clearly further, the "public interest in wise resolution of difficult and important issues presented." 1s2 Other courts
apparently wanted to secure diverse viewpoints, garner information
that might improve judicial decisionmaking, or afford those who
expended resources lobbying an opportunity to be heard, especially
on an issue as controversial and volatile as abortion. 1s3

dismissed for lack of standing; proper analysis to test whether defendant has sufficient
interest to appeal is whether court abused discretion in permitting intervention); Citizens
for Community Action, 558 F.2d at 869 (interest in maintaining property values by defending
ordinance imposing moratorium on construction of abortion facilities sufficient).
150. The federal judiciary will be extremely reluctant to reconsider any constitutional
issues, and a ruling on an abortion statute's constitutionality will be given weighty effect
even if the prospect of multiple litigation is not strong. See supra note 67 and accompanying
text. See also Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d at 869 (potential erosion of property
values in context of abortion ordinance challenge is sufficient impairment).
151. The best example is Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d at 869-70.
152. See Keith, 764 F.2d at 1273 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
153. These factors may well have influenced courts whose decisionmaking is inaccessible
or terse. They also may have led one court to premise intervention in an abortion funding
challenge by members of Congress on their citizen-taxpayer status. See McRae v. Mathews,
421 F. Supp. 533, 540 (E.D.N. Y. 1976), appeal dismissed sub nom. Buckley v. McRae,
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The federal judiciary has provided practically no explanation
for grants of permissive intervention or amicus status. Courts
allowing permissive intervention seemingly found that applicants'
asserted defenses shared common questions with the principal
action and that their need to participate was more important than
prejudice to the litigants or harm to the judicial process. Although
amicus participation is the preferred form of involvement in abortion litigation, courts have rarely explained the grants, perhaps
deeming it unnecessary as their decisionmaking is wholly discretionary . 154 Amicus participation enables courts to secure most
benefits the applicants might provide while reducing the potential
disadvantages, namely delay, that party status entails. 155
One significant aspect of judicial determinations allowing involvement has been some courts' willingness to impose conditions
on the grant of participation. The Akron litigation, discussed
earlier, affords a helpful example. 156 The district judge, perhaps
aware of the possible complications of intervention, permitted the
applicants to intervene only in their '' ' ... individual capacity as
parents of unmarried minor daughters of child-bearing age' '' and
not as guardians ad litem for "unborn children" or "infants born
alive as the result of legal abortion. " 157 The court limited the scope
of intervention, restricting trial involvement, for example, to direct
evidence and cross-examination pertaining to the intervenors' claims
as parents. 158 "With regard to any other issues, intervenor-defendants' participation was limited to submission of amicus curiae
briefs." 159
In short, some courts have permitted participation by individuals
and groups seeking to defend restrictive abortion legislation against
attack. Successful applicants have prolonged the resolution of
litigation, displacing the original defendants in some lawsuits and

433 U.S. 916, vacated sub nom. Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977). But see Roe v.
Casey, 464 F. Supp. 483, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (taxpayer status held too indirect and remote
to support intervention).
154. Even courts that seem the least amenable to granting intervention often welcome
amicus participation. See, e.g., Keith, 764 F.2d at 1268; Casey, 464 F. Supp. at 487. See
supra text accompanying note 103.
155. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
156. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D.
Ohio 1984).
157. Id. at 1272 & n.4. See generally supra note 106 (judicial treatment of guardian ad
!item requests).
158. Akron, 604 F. Supp. at 1272 & n.4.
159. Id. See also supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (similar approach by courts
granting amicus participation).
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continuing the litigation without them in the worst cases . 160 The
intervenors have demanded the treatment of new issues, participated in discovery, introduced extensive direct testimony, conducted lengthy cross-examination, and filed many papers requiring
replies of plaintiffs, even when courts attempted to circumscribe
involvement severely. 161 A few participants who were limited to
filing amicus briefs nonetheless demanded elaborate responses of
plaintiffs and judges. 162 Those abortion opponents granted amicus
or party status have been considerably more likely to delay and
even obstruct litigation's prompt disposition than to contribute
significantly to issue resolution. 163 The effects on plaintiffs have
been equally deleterious when permission to participate has been
improperly granted. 164 Of course, any type of involvement can
impose substantial costs on litigants and the judicial system. 165
Moreover, plaintiffs may be unable to recover attorneys' fees from
intervenors in a number of the new abortion cases, notwithstanding
the extent of plaintiffs' success or of intervenors' responsibility
for prolonging the litigation. 166 That problem is particularly troublesome because evidence of past cooperation between abortion
opponents and governmental defendants indicates that they could
plan future litigation in ways that may prevent plaintiffs from

160. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986). See supra text accompanying
notes 12-17.
161. See, e.g., Akron, 604 F. Supp. at 1268. See also supra text accompanying notes
19-22.
162. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
163. Remarkably few of the numerous opinions in the federal reporter system or
available on computer indicated that abortion opponents had contributed anything substantive to issue resolution.
164. See Diamond, 476 U.S. 54. Cf. id. at 71, 74-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (Diamond improper intervenor). See supra text accompanying notes 4-18.
165. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. Even unsuccessful applications can
be costly for parties and judges, although these must be considered part of the fixed costs
of litigating in federal court.
166. Plaintiffs may be unable to recover fees if the courts require them to show that
"intervenors' action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Independent
Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2736 (1989). The Zipes Court did
not address, however, whether its standard would apply to intervenors in abortion cases.
In Zipes, the intervenor was a union seeking to protect its members who would be adversely
affected by the settlement of a sex discrimination class action suit. The Court stated the
issue was "only the liability of intervenors who enter lawsuits to defend their own
constitutional or statutory rights." Id. at 2737 n.4. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court
also denied Dr. Diamond's petition for a writ of certiorari, allowing to stand a large award
of attorneys' fees against him. Diamond v. Charles, 109 S. Ct. 3214 (1989).
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securing any fees. 167 Furthermore, while the total number of requests to participate in post-Roe abortion litigation has been less
than enormous and those granted have not been overwhelming,
the future is ominous. Abortion opponents-who may believe
themselves closer to victory than ever-are unlikely to forgo any
opportunity to defend restrictive measures, especially when that
could require trusting their hard-fought victories to the vicissitudes
of governmental representation. 168 All of these factors mean that
the federal judiciary, lawyers, and litigants must be fully prepared
to respond to the participatory requests that inevitably will be
submitted in imminent abortion litigation.

D. Suggestions for Treating Participatory Requests in the New
Abortion Litigation
The number and strength of arguments against participation are
clearly greater than those favoring it. Perhaps most persuasive are
the detrimental consequences experienced by judges, lawyers, and
parties, even when the courts have consciously attempted to curtail
involvement sharply. Thus, the federal judiciary should seriously
consider prohibiting any participation. The complications of party
involvement should make courts particularly reluctant to permit
intervention of right or permissive intervention under Rule 24.
Judges who believe that some participation is appropriate should
ascertain whether amicus involvement will suffice. Courts allowing
any type of participation should impose conditions on that grant
whenever necessary.
1.

Rule 24(a)(2)

Courts should reject requests to intervene of right, because the
complications of such participation render it unnecessary and
inadvisable. Many convincing arguments counsel against intervention of right. These are premised on the language of Rule 24(a)(2),
its underlying policies, and other policies concerning the fair and
expeditious resolution of litigation.

167. Justice Marshall characterized such future cooperation to avoid any fee liability in
the civil rights context as a "likely consequence" of the majority decision in Zipes. Zipes,
109 S. Ct. at 2746 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a cogent example of prior cooperation,
see supra text accompanying note 22.
168. See generally Tobias, supra note 49, at 329 n.344. Correspondingly, if opposition
to abortion were a litmus test for the recent appointment of many federal judges as
numerous observers have asserted, those judges may well be receptive to granting abortion
opponents' applications.
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As a general proposition, courts should read the Rule narrowly,
requiring that applicants clearly satisfy each of its four requirements. This approach finds support in the Rule's terminology, in
the 1966 amendment, and in considerable judicial application.
Many circuit and district courts, particularly in recent opinions,
have interpreted the Rule more restrictively. 169 Moreover, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's 1989 admonition against broadly reading Rules
19 and 24 170 in the context of public law litigation 111 also supports
a narrow interpretation of Rule 24. In short, numerous plausible
arguments may be marshaled in favor of a restrictive interpretation
of Rule 24. 172
Those seeking to intervene of right in the anticipated abortion
litigation will likely lack the requisite interest. Numerous judges
have narrowly read the language of Rule 24(a)(2) to require that
applicants show a direct, significant, legally protectable interest in
the suit's subject matter. 173 Indeed, a growing number of circuit
and district courts has demanded even more; potential intervenors
must be able to state a claim for relief or have something equivalent
to, or greater than, standing. 174 For these courts, any applicant
who asserts interests similar to those of Dr. Diamond or the IPC
(in Keith) would lack the requisite interest under their own case
law and Diamond. 175 Even the significant number of judges who
apply the demanding, but less stringent, requirement of a direct,
significant, legally protectable interest should find that potential
intervenors lack sufficient interest in the litigation's subject matter,
the constitutionality of a state statute. Individual citizens or groups,

169. See, e.g., supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. For examples in the abortion
context, see Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985)
and Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 71 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
170. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 governs the "joinder of persons needed for
just adjudication."
171. In Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2186-87 (1989), petitioners argued against
the Court's application of Rules 19 and 24 because it would be "burdensome and ultimately
discouraging to civil rights litigation." Id. at 2187. The Chief Justice responded that even
were the majority "wholly persuaded by these arguments as a matter of policy, acceptance
of them would require a rewriting rather than an interpretation of the relevant [r]ules."
Id.
172. I am not denying, as the supra text accompanying notes 52-83 makes clear, that
there are narrow and broad lines of authority. I am saying only that the narrower line has
been ascendant of late and that it applies with special cogency in the abortion context.
173. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text (Supreme Court analysis of Dr.
Diamond's interest); supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (Seventh Circuit's analysis
of IPC's interest).
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even those that have successfully lobbied for legislation, simply
have no Rule 24 interest in defending the legislation against attack.
Only the state and its attorney general, local district attorneys, or
others empowered to defend or enforce abortion statutes have the
authority to defend them and the requisite Rule 24 interest. 176
Even judges who employ expansive approaches to the interest
criterion may find that the requirement cannot be satisfied. Under
the broadest articulation of the interest condition-that it is primarily a guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many
apparently interested parties as is consistent with efficiency and
due process-such factors as fairness, party control, and expeditious dispute resolution outweigh the participatory needs of applicants with interests as minuscule and attenuated as those of abortion
opponents. 177
Courts that find applicants lack the requisite interest have no
obligation to consider the remaining three requirements of Rule
24(a)(2). Nevertheless, for judges who doubt that the interest
condition has been satisfied and for courts that clearly have found
it met, the other criteria (impairment of interest, inadequacy of
representation, and timeliness of application) require analysis.
Courts determining that applicants have little interest would be
unlikely to consider it impaired, because the impairment condition
is closely related to the interest idea. Even judges who believe that
potential intervenors have greater interests may find them insufficiently substantial to suffer much prejudice. Conversely, courts
that consider the applicants' interests significant may well find
them impaired. Those thought to have a Rule 24 interest in
defending restrictive abortion legislation will appear threatened by
its challenge, especially because any adverse substantive determination rendered could be highly prejudicial. 178
There are many convincing arguments that those seeking to
intervene of right cannot satisfy the inadequate representation
requirement. A substantial number of circuit and district courts
apply a presumption of adequacy when the defendant is a governmental body charged by law with representing the potential intervenors. This presumption can be overcome only with a very
compelling showing of insufficiency. The presumption will be

176. See supra text accompanying notes 60, 115, 141. See also supra text accompanying
notes 70 and 13 7.
177. See supra text accompanying note 62. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist's recent
rejection of a broad reading of Rules 19 and 24 undermines this and other flexible
approaches to interest. See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2186-87 (1989).
178. See supra notes 67, 150, and accompanying text.
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peculiarly difficult to surmount in the abortion context. State
statutes authorize or even command attorneys general or others
charged with enforcing restrictive abortion legislation to defend its
constitutionality or validity . 179 It will be difficult to show inadequate governmental representation, especially in areas such as
constitutional law and statutory interpretation. The presumption
also enables courts to avoid delicate questions involving state
officials' competence or their dedication to defending the legislation.180 Moreover, numerous courts that failed to apply the presumption found representation sufficient or were reluctant to rule
that the government inadequately represented the state's citizenry . 181 These judges have. employed relatively restrictive tests of
inadequacy, requiring, for example, proof of governmental nonfeasance or collusion with other parties.
The peculiar nature of governmental representation, such as
officials' expertise on the critical issues and the close alignment of
defendants' and applicants' interests, means that even the courts
taking a flexible approach to adequacy requirements may determine
that the requirements have not been satisfied. Even searching
judicial scrutiny of governmental representation is unlikely to reveal
any inadequacy. 182
Courts should find that abortion opponents who fail to file
intervention requests promptly have not satisfied the timeliness
condition. Judges should rigorously apply the principal factors
developed to test timeliness. 183 They must examine closely the
period that has passed since the suit's commencement and any
reasons proffered for delay in seeking intervention. The highly

179. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 14, para. 4, 5 (Smith-Hurd 1963 & Supp. 1989);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 27.050-27.060 (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1990).
180. The ideas in this paragraph have been analyzed at several points in this Article.
See, e.g., supra note 176 and accompanying text. A finding of "inadequacy" does not
mean deficiency, but judges may still be reluctant to make that finding in the case of
governmental defendants, because it implicates delicate relationships between federal courts
and the state officials.
181. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. See also supra note 122 and accompanying text.
182. See American Nat'I Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 148-49 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J., concurring); Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir.)
(Cudahy, J., concurring), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77. A rigorous application is especially
appropriate in this context. The notoriety of the abortion issue means opponents will have
few persuasive reasons for delayed application and little cause to complain. Moreover,
there is minimal likelihood of a "sudden revelation of a divergence of interests" among
applicants and defendants, such as the unpredictable settlement negotiations between the
government and plaintiffs that may occur in other contexts. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River
& New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (D. Mass. 1989).
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controversial nature of abortion and opponents' strong commitment to restrictive legislation mean that judges should view with
circumspection any passage of time, being especially alert to delay
for tactical purposes. Courts also should be particularly sensitive
to the potential for prejudicing existing parties and for imposing
costs on the judicial system, finding applications untimely on these
bases alone. 184 Judges should also find that any significant difficulties for the litigants or for courts outweigh such factors as
prejudice to applicants and their potential contributions to issue
resolution. The potential for delay to harm parties and the judicial
system should be compelling when there has been any passage of
time, especially in light of applicants' minimal interests and the
concomitant prejudice and questionable nature of any excuses for
delay.
Numerous policies that directly underlie or relate to Rule 24(a)(2)
also warrant denial of requests to intervene of right. Perhaps most
important is the possibility of prejudice to existing parties. The
active involvement of intervenors could deprive litigants of control
over their cases. Considerable time, money, and effort may be
consumed in responding to issues that intervenors raise, to their
direct testimony and cross-examination, and to their appeals. Correspondingly, federal courts will have to devote significant resources to intervenors' participation.
In comparison, the need for applicants' participation as parties
in this context is relatively insubstantial. 185 The central issues in
the anticipated abortion litigation-which will overwhelmingly involve constitutional questions, statutory interpretation, and legislative intent-require limited factual development and can be
efficaciously treated through the submission of amicus briefs.
Concomitantly, applicants are not likely to have much relevant
expertise or many new ideas to contribute to issue resolution, or
to improve judicial decisionmaking, especially in light of governmental defendants' effective representation and the minimal value
of abortion opponents' input in past cases. Denying intervenor
status also will cause little loss in terms of the public values at
stake in this litigation. Abortion opponents will already have had
an ample opportunity to be heard in the legislature and to hold

184. The emphasis on judicial economy is justified by mounting concerns over the
litigation explosion and the escalating costs of civil litigation, although courts typically do
not list it among the most important timeliness factors. See supra notes 49, 76, and
accompanying text.
185. This discussion of policy, in both organizational and conceptual treatment, departs
slightly from the rule's requirements. In this paragraph, for example, applicants' minimal
need to participate is contrasted with party prejudice.
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elected officials accountable; party participation is unlikely to make
more palatable an adverse judicial determination. 186 All of these
policies argue strongly against permitting intervention of right.
Indeed, Justice Marshall just last term suggested the propriety of
amicus participation for applicants with interests similar to those
of abortion opponents. 187 .
Even judges who flexibly apply the Rule or generally would be
inclined to grant intervention of right might find these policies
overriding, especially in conjunction with applicants' comparatively
weak case for meeting the Rule's requirements. For instance, the
courts may consider the potential harm to original parties and to
the judicial system more compelling than the relatively minimal
need for the applicants' participation.
2.

Rule 24(b)

Courts also should reject perm1ss1ve intervention requests. A
number of arguments, some of which are similar to those against
intervention of right, support denial. Courts should first consider
the common question of law or fact requirement, which some
judges state demands an interest sufficient to support a legal claim
or defense. 188 Thus, courts that doubt the applicants have the
requisite interest to meet the first condition of Rule 24(a)(2) should
closely examine the related condition in Rule 24(b). Even if applicants satisfy the requirement, judges can deny permissive intervention when exercising their substantial discretion in light of other
relevant factors.

186. See generally supra text accompanying notes 82-83. I realize that these ideas and
others in this paragraph are controversial and could be criticized. For example, critics could
argue that, insofar as the central issues in abortion cases involve legal questions and require
little factual development, the potential for abortion opponents to delay resolution is
correspondingly lessened. This assertion is undermined by the example of the Akron
litigation, in which abortion opponents caused significant complications despite the sharp
limits on their participation. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. At the same time,
the idea that opponents' interests will not be impaired because they can pursue later,
separate litigation can be criticized in light of such litigation's limited prospects for success.
I clearly provide for that possibility, however. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 150,
178.
187. See Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2745 n.8
(1989) (Marshall, J .. dissenting) (citing Diamond and Akron as examples). One reason for
that suggestion was the possibility of cooperation between successful intervenors and
defendants to avoid fee liability. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. Judges should
be alert to this prospect in abortion litigation, which is an additional reason warranting
denial of intervention requests.
188. See supra notes 88, 143-44, and accompanying text.
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Courts should treat as paramount the express command of Rule
24(b) that they consider whether intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice existing parties' rights. Judges should analyze closely
applicants' requests and estimate the time and cost of their involvement, remembering that abortion opponents have substantially complicated numerous earlier cases even when their activity
was severely circumscribed. If courts believe that there is any
significant potential for delay or prejudice, denial of permissive
intervention will be warranted. If judges find that prejudice to
parties is not compelling, they should balance that factor against
other pertinent factors, especially the need for judicial economy
and the potential harm to applicants. Even courts that apply Rule
24(b) more broadly or are predisposed to allowing permissive
intervention might exercise their discretion to deny it in the abortion context because they believe that prejudice to parties is overriding, or, in combination with other factors, is more important
than the applicants' need to participate.
In short, Judge Wyzanski's 1943 exposition on party involvement
under the 1938 Rule retains considerable saliency:
Additional parties always take additional time. Even if they have no
witnesses of their own, they are the source of additional questions,
objections, briefs, arguments, motions and the like which tend to make
the proceeding a Donnybrook Fair. Where he presents no new questions,
a third party can contribute usually most effectively and always most
expeditiously by a brief amicus curiae and not by intervention.•••

Numerous courts still recite this passage or apply these ideas in
resolving intervention questions under the current version of Rule
24(b )(2). 190
3.

Amicus Participation

Judges should seriously consider whether there is any need for
amicus curiae participation. Several abortion cases indicate that
district courts and litigants have spent significant resources treating
submissions of amici. 191 They may have raised issues that the
original parties did not, provided new arguments on questions
already in dispute, or tendered duplicative or irrelevant material.
Plaintiffs probably have felt compelled to address many of these

189. Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 51 F.
Supp. 972, 973 (0. Mass. 1943).
190. See, e.g., Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98 F.R.D. II, 22-23 (E.D. Tex. 1982), appeal
dismissed, 710 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987);
British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 71 F.R.D. 583, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
191. See, e.g., cases cited at supra note 50.
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submissions, regardless of their persuasiveness, lest the ideas convince the court, thereby requiring an unnecessary appeal. Correspondingly, judges may choose to respond to amicus input because
of fairness considerations or to dissuade defendants from appealing
decisions. The potential costs to litigants and the judicial system
could well outweigh applicants' needs. Abortion opponents' "interest" in defending restrictive legislation probably will be capably
represented by governmental defendants. The opponents' "right
to be heard" can be satisifed through lobbying before the legislature. Even courts predisposed to permitting amicus involvement
might find the potential for unnecessary complications overriding
in the abortion context.
Notwithstanding those possible complications, some courts may
be reluctant to deny participation altogether. For these judges,
amicus involvement is a felicitous solution because it affords
numerous benefits of party participation while minimizing its disadvantages. For example, applicants can have as much impact on
the constitutional and statutory questions that likely will predominate by submitting amicus briefs. Amicus status also enables courts
to capitalize on applicants' expertise and their contributions to
issue resolution, potentially improving judicial decisionmaking.
Moreover, it affords an opportunity to be heard, albeit truncated.
Furthermore, amicus participation reduces significantly the possibility that applicants will impose great costs on litigants or the
judicial system.
4.

Conditioning Participation

If courts decide that some party or amicus involvement is
appropriate, they should seriously consider conditioning that participation.192 Judges should estimate as precisely as possible how
participation might impede expeditious dispute resolution and tailor
involvement accordingly. They may want to limit participation in
terms of raising new issues, taking discovery or filing motions,
introducing direct evidence or conducting cross-examination at
trial, or appealing.
CONCLUSION

Intervention exemplifies many procedural questions that courts,
lawyers, and litigants are likely to encounter in the anticipated
abortion litigation. Analysis of intervention requests illustrates the

192. For further discussion of the ideas in this paragraph, see supra text accompanying
notes 97-100, 156-59.
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importance of the requirements in the federal rules and other
authoritative sources, such as Title 28 of the United States Code.
Application of these factors shows that potential intervenors in
abortion cases should be permitted to participate, if at all, only
as amici curiae. A comparatively straightforward interpretation of
the language of Rule 24(a)(2) demonstrates that abortion opponents
lack the type of interest required and that governmental defendants
will adequately represent an:y interest they might assert. Moreover,
the original parties' need to control the litigation, and the concerns
of parties and judges about expeditious resolution and effective
case management are significant. These factors are compelling in
light of the potential complications raised by intervention, the
limited need for applicants to participate as parties, and the
minimal likelihood that they will contribute to issue resolution and
improve judicial decisionmaking.
An examination of intervention also identifies additional concerns relevant in the context of abortion litigation. Intervention
demonstrates how resource disparities among parties and litigation
financing issues can drive much modern litigation. 193 Abortion
opponents' attempts to participate cogently illustrate how what
might seem to be a comparatively obscure point of procedural law
can assume importance out of all proportion to its apparent
magnitude. Correspondingly, intervention shows the inseparability
of process and substance and how process can shade into, become,
and even dictate substance. Perhaps most striking, the procedural
effort to intervene in abortion litigation replicates the substantive
effort of the state to intrude into women's reproductive decisionmaking. Finally, intervention illustrates which voices are entitled
to be, and actually are, heard in federal court, for whom they
speak and under what conditions, and at what cost on the abortion
question, the most divisive domestic legal issue of our time.

193. See supra notes 18, 48, 165-66, and accompanying text.

